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By Albert E. Utton*
International Groundwater
Management: The Case of
The U.S.-Mexican Frontier
The general picture is one of more recent resort to ground water...
without an adequate understanding of the physics of the resource
and without regard, generally speaking, for the future.,
I. THE LEGAL CONTEXT
The heaviest groundwater users in the United States are the
states which are contiguous to Mexico, 2 and yet, paradoxically,
the law and institutions of the border states are woefully inade-
quate to control the exploitation of their groundwater re-
sources.3 In addition, international competence over aquifers
divided by the frontier is largely undefined;4 it is fair to say that
the legal and institutional situation is chaotic.
It has been suggested that none of the border states has
adequate legislation or regulations for the protection and manage-
ment of diminishing supplies within the state and along the border
areas. New Mexico has the only public control system, but regulations
under it do not contemplate joint controls in the area of the border.
Arizona and Texas have virtually no controls except voluntary ones,
and the California law is beholden to similar rules of capture which do
little to discourage excessive pumping and waste.
5
In contrast to the legal situation on the United States side of
* Professor of Law, University of New Mexico. B.A. (Eons.) 1953, University
of New Mexico; B.A. (Juris.) (Eons.) Oxon 1956; M.A. (Juris.) Oxon 1959.
1. Hayton, The Ground Water Legal Regime as Instrument of Policy Objec-
tives and Management Requirements, in 2 ANNALES JURIS AQUARUM 272,
275 (2d Int'l Conf. on Water Law & Admin., Caracas, Venezuela Feb. 8-14,
1976).
2. Clark, Institutional Alternatives for Managing Groundwater Resources:
Notes for a Proposal, 18 NAT. RESOURCES J. 153, 155 (1978).
3. Burman & Cornish, Needed: a Ground-water Treaty Between the United
States and Mexico, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 385, 388-91 (1975).
4. See note 11 and accompanying text infra. It must be noted, however, that
the International Boundary and Water Commission has done a remarkable
job of resolving groundwater problems with a minimum of treaty mandate
or international practice as precedent.
5. Clark, supra note 2, at 155-56.
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the frontier, Mexico does have legal authority to control ground-
water withdrawals. The national government can regulate ex-
traction through the Secretariat of Water Resources, and the
Secretary, on his own initiative, can establish prohibited
groundwater zones if existing developments or the aquifer are
in danger of being adversely affected, 6 or if it is otherwise in the
public interest.
Coincident with the near legal vacuum, significant popula-
tion increases are projected on both sides of the border, making
it reasonable to anticipate that there will be increasing invest-
ment in groundwater facilities and accelerating demand placed
on groundwater resources bisected by the international boun-
dary between the two countries.7 These two factors could be
described as on a collision course. With increased demand for a
limited resource, combined with a striking absence of institu-
tions for either resolving disputes or managing the resource, the
potential for dispute between the two countries has to be some-
thing more than imaginary. 8
6. Teclaff, Abstraction and Use of Water: A Comparison of Legal Regimes,
U.N. Doc. ST/ECHI/154 62 (1972). See CONSTITUCI6N POLiTICA art. 27
(Mexico).
7. See Alba, Condiciones y Polfticas Econ6micas en la Frontera Norte de
Mdxico, 17 NAT. RESOURCES J. 571 (1977); Bradley 8 DeCook, Ground
Water Occurrence and Utilization in the Arizona-Sonora Border Regions,
18 NAT. RESOURCES J. 29 (1978); Day, International Aquifier Management:
The Hueco Bolson on the Rio Grande River, 18 NAT. RESOURCES J. 163
(1978).
8. Three examples will serve to illustrate the possibilities for conflict over
United States-Mexican groundwater resources:
1. Near San Luis, Sonora, a well field was put into operation in 1972.
The field contains 63 wells with pumps and concrete lined laterals.
The water is collected in a canal flowing westerly to San Luis for
irrigation. This pumping by Mexico from the underground reser-
voir tends to deplete groundwater underlying both the United
States and Mexico. The groundwater basin is straddled by the inter-
national boundary. Further, the water pumped on the Mexican side
came originally from the Colorado River, in that the water used to
irrigate the mesa lands in the Yuma area was diverted from the
Colorado. After being placed on the fields in Arizona, it gradually
percolated down, forming a mound of groundwater. Since Mexico
was pumping water from this underground base, it was really tak-
ing Colorado River water which was not charged against the Mexi-
can allocation under the Treaty of 1944, "since underground flow
across the border is not considered as 'deliveries in satisfaction of
the Treaty."' Bradley & DeCook, supra note 7, at 37. See Treaty
Respecting Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Riv-
ers and of the Rio Grande, Feb. 3, 1944, 59 Stat. 1291, T.S. No. 944
(effective Nov. 8, 1945). In order to avoid a "pumping war" between
the two countries, the governments of the United States and Mexico
agreed to limit to 160,000 acre feet annually pumping of groundwa-
ters within five miles of the Arizona-Sonora boundary near San
Luis.
2. In the Nogales region, the municipal and industrial uses of both the
city of Nogales, Sonora, and the city of Nogales, Arizona, are sup-
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The situation of a near legal vacuum is not unique to the
United States-Mexican frontier, since only recently has much
attention been directed to groundwater resources. Hayton ob-
served that "traditionally there has been a failure to focus on
the regulation and management of ground water in most legal
systems."9 Professor Clark added that, "Legislative attention to
the physical relationship between surface and ground-water
sources is scarcely older than the concern for pollution."'10 It has
been, in fact, a question of being out of sight and out of mind.
The primary attention of domestic water law has been focused
on surface water, and there is an almost complete lack of
groundwater practice at the international level. There are some
treaties, such as the agreement between Poland and the USSR,
signed at Warsaw on July 17, 1964," which refer to groundwa-
ters. That treaty came into force on February 16, 1965, through
an exchange of the instruments of ratification at Moscow, and
in a general way includes groundwaters "intersected by the
State frontier" in frontier waters. 12 There is also Minute 242
between the United States and Mexico, which limits pumping on
both sides of the frontier in the Yuma area,13 and the Interna-
plied by groundwater. On the Mexican side, there are well fields
along the Santa Cruz River to supply the city of Nogales, Sonora.
On the Arizona side, five wells supply the city of Nogales, Arizona.
The Santa Cruz River, which rises in Arizona, flows into Sonora
and then loops back into Arizona so that the city of Nogales, Son-
ora, is in fact upstream from the city of Nogales, Arizona. The wells
of the city of Nogales, Arizona, show an immediate response to
river flows in the Santa Cruz, so that the depth of water in the city's
wells fluctuates from thirty to eighty feet. Thus, with both cities
looking to the same limited water supplies for their survival there is
potential for conflict between the two countries as population
continues to grow on both sides of the international boundary.
Bradley & DeCook, supra note 7, passim.
3. The metropolitan area of Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, and El Paso,
Texas, has nearly one million inhabitants. Both cities depend large-
ly on shared groundwater reservoirs for their municipal water sup-
plies. Studies indicate that both sides are now pumping water at a
rate faster than the groundwater reservoir is being recharged. See
Day, supra note 7, at 168-69.
9. Hayton, supra note 1, at 275.
10. Clark, Western Ground-Water Law, in 5 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 440,
at 411 (R. Clark ed. 1972). See also Fischer, Management of Interstate
Groundwater, 7 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 521, 523 (1974); Harnsberger, Neb-
raska Ground Water Problems, 42 NEB. L. REV. 721 (1963); Moses, The Law
of Ground Water-Does Modern Buried Treasure Create a New Breed of
Pirates?, 11 ROCKY MTN. MINERAL L. INST. 277 (1966); Teclaff, supra note 6,
at 57.
11. Agreement concerning the use of Water Resources in Frontier Waters, July
17, 1964, Poland-U.S.S.R., No. 8054, 552 U.N.T.S. 188 (1966).
12. Id. art. 2, n.2.
13. Text of IBWC Minute No. 242, 69 DEPT. STATE BULL. 395, 396, res. 5 (1973),
reprinted in 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 2, 6 (1975).
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tional Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) has dealt suc-
cessfully with groundwater problems on a pragmatic, ad hoc
basis; but, by and large, groundwaters have not been a matter of
concern at the international level. As in the case of groundwa-
ters generally, "[i]t is more a case of non-management than one
of mismanagement."'
14
Teclaff points out that frequently groundwater has not been
included in the established surface water law regime: "[Ilt was
thought quite adequate to treat groundwater either as part of
the land ... or as a commodity, susceptible of ownership
through the act of capturing it by sinking a well."' 5 For example,
under Spanish law, which has influenced the groundwater law
in Latin America and the Philippines, "ground waters have
traditionally belonged to the owner of the superjacent land."' 6
English common law has also given absolute ownership to
groundwaters to the superjacent property owner. For example,
Wells Hutchins states that the English common law doctrine
[i]n its original form . . .accords exclusive property rights in the
water to the landowner; it gives him the right to pump out the water
at any time and in any quantity, for any legitimate enterprise, either
on or off the overlying land .... But if the effect of heavy pumping by
a landowner, while engaged in any legitimate enterprise .... is to
exhaust the ground-water supply of his neighbor by drawing all the
water from the substrata of the latter's tract into his own heavily
pumped well, it cannot become the ground of an action.
17
Texas follows the English common law doctrine, and the Texas
law of groundwater has been summarized as "you can steal
your neighbor's water, but you can't pollute his well."'
8
It has been suggested that "the problem, then, for water
lawyers and administrators, is to fashion a legal regime and a
management machinery"'19 which will be integrated in order to
achieve the optimum sustained yield of a nation's, or a region's,
total water resources.
The purpose of this article is to suggest possible legal re-
gimes and management machinery to manage the groundwater
resources intersected by the United States-Mexican frontier.
14. Hayton, supra note 1, at 284.
15. Teclaff, supra note 6, at 57.
16. Hayton, supra note 1, at 278.
17. Hutchins, Reasonable Beneficial Use in the Development of Ground Wa-
ter Law in the West, in GROUND WATER ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 24 (West-
ern Agric. Econ. Res. Council Comm. on Econ. of Water Resources Dev.,
Rep. No. 5, 1956) (emphasis added).
18. Tyler, Underground Water Regulation in Texas, 39 TEx. B. J. 532, 533
(1976).
19. Hayton, supra note 1, at 293.
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II. THE ECONOMIC CONTEXT
Under the common law doctrine, each owner's right to the
water itself, or the right to use the water, is insecure because
other pumpers may take possession of the mobile resource at
any time.20 Accordingly, the individual surface owner is en-
couraged to exploit the groundwater resource as quickly as
possible, so that the fluid and mobile water resource will not be
captured by others:
[The d]efinite property rights belong only to those who are in posses-
sion-that is, who get there "fustest with the mostest." Every user tries
to protect himself against others by acquiring ownership through
capture in the fastest possible way. Deferred ise is always subject to
great uncertainty; others may capture the resource in the meantime.2 '
It has also been noted that
in the absence of effective social institutions to guide resource use,
private groundwater use can be predicted eventually to generate ex-
cessive investment and extraction costs; induce a pumping rate which
is greater than socially optimal, and which may lead to irreversible
depletion; dissipate economic rent or producer surplus, and in general
create economic waste and resource inefficiency. 22
This situation thus leads to great insecurity for all existing users
of water from an aquifer, although the concepts of "security"
and "flexibility" are essential criteria for an adequate water
rights system.23 Underlying the concept of physical security is
the premise that holders of groundwater rights must have a
reasonable degree of certainty-the supply of water must not be
unreasonably uncertain. Ordinarily, the physical supply of
groundwater is more secure than surface water, since the aqui-
fer frequently stores water in seasons and years of heavy rain
and above average recharge. This stored water can then be used
in seasons and years of lower rain fall and lower recharge.
In addition, however, there is the factor of "tenure securi-
ty."'24 Tenure security does not refer to reliability of supply, but
to the effect of human actions on the reliability of supply, that is,
the security of the land owner from the unreasonable use or
export of groundwater by his neighbor. The common law rule of
absolute ownership obviously increases tenure insecurity be-
cause it countenances the unrestrained right of one's neighbor
20. See S. CIRIACY-WANTRUP, RESOURCE CONSERVATION, ECONOMICS AND
POLICIES, 141-45 (3d ed. 1968).
21. Id. at 142.
22. Veeman, Water Policy and Water Institutions in Northern India: The
Case of Ground Water Rights, 18 NAT. RESOURCES J. n.p. (1978).
23. Ciriacy-Wantrup, Concepts Used as Economic Criteria for a System of
Water Rights, in ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY IN WATER RESOURCE DE-
VELOPMENT 251-71 (S. Smith & E. Castle eds. 1964).
24. Id. at 253.
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to pump all the water he may need, without restraint or liability
to other overlying owners for any adverse effects of his pump-
ing. This has the economic effect of stimulating investment in
groundwater development because of the uncertainty of one's
property right over this "fugitive resource. ' 25 There is an incen-
tive to each land owner to protect himself against his neighbor's
lawful acts by capturing as much of the resource as quickly as
possible. Therefore, there is an economic incentive for overin-
vestment and for depletion, rather than for conservation of the
resource.
This conceptual approach has been elaborated on by Kelso,
Martin, and Mack:
Two aspects of water rights most significant for an understanding
of men's behavior relative to water and to one another over water are:
(1)... that whatever rights they hold to water and its use will be stable
and dependable over time, and (2) the flexibility permitted to them to
effect changes in use and location of use of the water covered by their
rights, and to acquire and transfer water rights from and to
others .... Security and flexibility are the twin essences of socially
efficient property relations.
26
Thus, the twin concepts of flexibility and security require
that owners of groundwater rights have security in their use and
that groundwater rights be readily transferable between uses
and users. As Veeman points out, "the indefiniteness of proper-
ty rights associated with a fugitive resource such as groundwa-
ter leads to its rapid development and, perhaps, depletion. '27
Specifically, in regard to the situation along the United
States-Mexican border, it cannot be said that water users have
security in their expectations, nor can it be said that whatever
rights they hold to water and its use will be stable and depend-
able over time. Quite the contrary, there are (1) projections for
growing population along both sides of the border, (2) a situa-
tion in which no state north of the border (with the exception of
New Mexico) has legal institutions adequate to control pump-
ing, and (3) no international control except at Yuma under the
interim arrangement of Resolution 5 of Minute 242,28 which can
prevent either nation from "stealing its neighbor's water. ' 29
Therefore, a situation exists which encourages each nation to
outdo its neighbor by developing its groundwater resources as
25. Id. at 258-60.
26. M. KELSO, W. MARTIN & L. MACK, WATER SUPPLIES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
IN AN ARID ENVIRONMENT: AN ARIZONA CASE STUDY 52, 54 (1973).
27. Veeman, supra note 22, at 20.
28. Text of IBWC Minute No. 242, supra note 13, at 396, res. 5.
29. Tyler, supra note 18, at 532.
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rapidly as possible, perhaps even to the point of depletion of the
groundwater resource.
The legal situation encourages overdevelopment; over-
development results in over investment in developing the re-
source and, therefore, both economic waste and resource waste
are likely due to the insecurity arising from inadequate institu-
tional controls. Moreover, the increase in use by one pumper
can lead to increasing the marginal costs of the second pumper.
In cases in which overdraft occurs,
the private pumper who, through extraction of water, causes draw-
down in nearby wells, bears only his private costs of additional with-
drawal. Part of the cost of additional pumping is imposed on neigh-
boring users whose conditions of pumping are adversely affected. In
these circumstances, the private marginal costs of pumping by the
individual user are less than the social marginal cost-a classic case of
technological external diseconomy.30
In addition to the depletion of the aquifer, the extraction of
groundwater can affect the quality of the water by lowering the
water table or hydrostatic pressure "so as to allow adjoining,
contaminated waters to flow into the reservoir."3' The following
possible economic ramifications of deteriorating groundwater
conditions have been projected:
Crop yields will decrease; there will be efforts to shift to other crops or
activities in the zone, and abandonment of formerly productive
economic activity. There will be increased costs to industry to treat
water prior to use, or it will be necessary to bring in acceptable water
from elsewhere. As the water table is lowered, there is increased
consumption of energy for the additional lifting by pumps, and wells
will need to be deepened, or new wells sunk, to tap the same aquifer.
Outmigration of the affected population and changes in gainful ac-
tivities will result in dislocations affecting economic planning ....
Finally, it is likely that there will be important impacts on the devel-
opment and conservation of other resources resulting from de-
teriorated ground water conditions, where dependence on that source
for water is significant.32
The history of groundwater development presents a "general
picture.. . of more recent resort to ground water. . . without
an adequate understanding of the physics of the resource and
without regard, generally speaking, for the future.
33
III. ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL OPPORTUNITIES
In suggesting possible institutional arrangements for the
management of transboundary resources between the United
30. Veeman, supra note 22, at 24.
31. Fischer, supra note 10, at 522.
32. Hayton, supra note 1, at 286.
33. Id. at 275.
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States and Mexico, it is necessary to consider in addition to the
twin criteria of security and flexibility, the goal of avoiding
conflict between the two countries, and the fundamental goal of
the public interest in providing "for an orderly development of
ground-water supplies, in the interest of the best utilization of
this natural resource.
34
A system should be devised which will reduce the likelihood
of water users on one side of the international boundary ad-
versely affecting water users on the other side of the boundary,
thereby causing conflict between the two countries.
IV. POSSIBLE MANAGEMENT OPTIONS
A. Option 1: The Status Quo Ante
The first option would be to leave the situation largely as it is,
following the essentially laissez-faire English common law doc-
trine allowing each country on each side of the boundary to use
and exploit the groundwater resources on its respective side as
it sees fit, without regard to its neighbor. This would lead to (1)
neither of the water users having security in that resource, (2)
uneconomic development of the resource by encouraging overly
rapid development, (3) increased marginal cost to all exploiters
of the resource, and (4) encouragement of the depletion of the
resource. It, therefore, would not provide the security essential
to a good groundwater system. Further, at some point it inevi-
tably would lead to conflict between the two countries which, if
not settled amicably by agreement, might be taken to the Inter-
national Court of Justice or an arbitral tribunal. This scenario is
not an attractive one. Friction between the two countries and
potential for conflict would be raised to undesirable levels, and
the economic waste caused by over-rapid development would
already have occurred, as well as undoubtedly substantial dam-
age to the groundwater resources due to excessive withdrawals.
In addition, it is always hard to assess the perils and uncertain-
ties of resort to litigation.
B. Option 2: Correlative Rights
Another possible approach would be to establish the doc-
trine of correlative rights over transboundary aquifers, but this,
too, has serious drawbacks. The correlative rights doctrine may
be viewed as a limitation on the common law rule,35 in that, as
used in California, the landowner has the right to make use of
34. W. HUTCHINS, SELECTED PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF WATER RIGHTS IN THE
WEST 178 (U.S. Dept. Agric. Misc. Pub. No. 418, 1942).
35. Clark, supra note 10, § 441, at 413.
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the waters underlying his lands subject to the co-extensive and
co-equal rights existing in adjoining landowners. Thus, a sur-
face owner's right to use the underlying waters is not unlimited
as under the common law rule, but limited by co-extensive and
co-equal rights of adjoining landowners.3 6
The formula for prorationing an aquifer has been expressed
as follows: "[l]n a time of water shortage each landowner is said
to have a share of the underlying water in proportion to the
amount of land he owns as compared with the total area sup-
plied by the common water source. 3 7 This prorationing of the
overall pool contemplates that the total pie can be cut into small-
er and smaller pieces, so that one individual piece of the pie at
the time of development and investment can be reduced to the
point of inefficiency. This means that the traditional correlative
rights doctrine contains a large element of insecurity in that
there is no limit on the number of pumpers that can begin
pumping at any time, since the right to exploit the water is not
lost by failure to appropriate, abandonment, or disuse. The New
Mexico Supreme Court, in Yeo v. Tweedy, 8 stated:
According to the "correlative rights" doctrine, each overlying owner
would have the same right-the right to use whenever he saw fit. The
right does not arise from any appropriation to beneficial use, which
develops the resources of the state. It is not lost or impaired by nonuse.
Regardless of the improvements and investments of the pioneers,
later comers or later developers may claim their rights. The exercise
of those rights which have been in abeyance will frequently destroy or
impair existing improvements, and may so reduce the rights of all that
none are longer of practical value, and that the whole district is re-
duced to a condition of nonproductiveness. The preventive for such
unfortunate and uneconomic results is found in the recognition of the
superior rights of prior appropriators. Invested capital and im-
provements are thus protected. New appropriations may thus be
made only from a supply not already in beneficial use. Nonuse in-
volves forfeiture. A great natural public resource is thus both utilized
and conserved.39
The correlative rights doctrine has been referred to
as one of "equalitarian rigidity" which "provides little assur-
ance to developers unfamiliar with the hydrologic data neces-
sary to estimate long range water supply and takes no account
of the relative values of different uses to the community. '"40
Moreover, it is argued that the correlative rights theory does not
36. 2 W. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 670
(completed by H. Ellis & P. DeBral, U.S. Dept. Agric. Misc Pub. No. 1206,
1974).
37. M. McDOUGAL & D. HABER, PROPERTY, WEALTH, LAND 993 (1948).
38. 34 N.M. 611, 286 P. 970 (1929).
39. Id. at 620, 286 P. at 974.
40. M. McDOUGAL & D. HABER, supra note 37, at 993.
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"succeed in removing the basic drawbacks of judicial adminis-
tration of groundwater distribution. The hydrologic data re-
quired . . .are difficult to obtain and the courts do not have
adequate staffs to do the necessary fact gathering job"41 to
provide continuing supervision. It might be postulated that an
international agency such as the International Boundary and
Water Commission (IBWC) could supervise a correlative rights
approach and make the necessary calculations and technical
and engineering studies in order to assure that correlative rights
are diminished equally as new appropriators begin to exploit
the water under their land. However, the security of existing
water uses would still be inadequately protected, and the flexi-
bility of transfer would also be inadequate unless the traditional
doctrine were significantly modified.42
C. Option 3: Management
1. Variation A (Equitable Apportionment)
There is a spectrum of possible variations on the option of
establishing institutional mechanisms for managing the re-
source. One would be to grant the IBWC the following powers:
1. jurisdiction over groundwaters intersected by the inter-
national boundary;
2. comprehensive authority to make the engineering studies
41. Id. The development of the law and management of oil and gas provides
some historic parallels. William Onorato traces this development and
points out that the early law of unregulated production or unrestricted
capture gave way to the doctrine of correlative rights and duties between
owners in a common source. The doctrine of correlative rights in turn has
been replaced by rules
requiring cooperative development of a shared petroleum resource
pool .... The laws of a majority of oil-producing nations specific-
ally provide that when an oil-bearing structure is located in two or
more tracts belonging to two or more different owners and thus the
source of dispute between them as to apportionment, the interested
parties are obliged to adopt a unitised plan of development under
which competition is now altogether eliminated and co-operation is
required on co-ordinating such points as number and spacing of
wells tapping the common source.
Onorato, Apportionment of an International Common Petroleum Deposit,
17 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 85, 92 (1968).
42. There is nothing sacrosanct about a particular doctrine which should
make it immutable. For example, there is nothing inherent in the doctrine
of correlative rights which would make it impossible to limit the total
number of water users, or provide for forfeiture or abandonment, but
unfortunately it seems that "[a] doctrinal label brings an automatically
prepackaged assortment of rules." C. CORKER, GROUNDWATER LAW, MAN-
AGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 112 (Nat'l Water Comm'n 1971).
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necessary to determine such. information as the area,
depth to water, aquifer thickness, volume, quality, quan-
tity, anticipated yields, transmissibility and recharge rate
of an aquifer. IBWC could determine allowable levels of
withdrawal in order to maintain a sustained yield from
the aquifer or a calculated mining plan. It should be
noted that the IBWC is already gathering this type of
data;43
3. responsibility to identify and declare designated interna-
tional groundwater areas which have reasonably ascer-
tainable boundaries; and
4. authority to apportion the waters of the aquifer and close
the area to withdrawals beyond the allowable as deter-
mined by the physical criteria of the aquifer.
This approach would follow roughly the current practice of the
state of New Mexico, in which the State Engineer has juris-
diction over declared basins that have "reasonably ascertain-
able boundaries," 44 and has power to close these declared basins
to further withdrawals. 45 The IBWC, rather than waiting for
development to reach the point at which a safe yield of the
aquifer were threatened, could apportion in advance the
groundwaters intersected by the boundary on its own initiative.
Various alternative methods conceivably could be suggested as
guidelines in calculating the division: (1) the amount of water
that each nation would receive could be based upon the amount
of recoverable water underlying each nation; or (2) the amount
of water could be based upon the relative surface areas of each
nation overlying the water--each nation would receive the pro-
portionate share of the groundwater that its surface area re-
flected in proportion to the total surface area overlying the
aquifer. Both of these approaches would require much more
43. Interview with government officials (Feb. 1978). See Day, supra note 7, at
176.
44. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 75-11-1 (1968). This proposal is not unlike the 1973 Okla-
homa statute, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82, § 1020.5 (West Supp. 1977), which
proposes to assign each landowner a specific quantity of water
based on a percentage of the hydrologically determined yield of the
basin. His allocation is to be measured, acre for acre, by the rela-
tionship his ownership bears to the total acreage overlying the
basin .... Under this system each landowner receives a quota, as
it were, which he can retain or dispose of and which will exhaust
his interest.
Clark, The Role of State Legislation in Ground Water Management, 10
CREIGHTON L. REv. 469, 482 (1977).
45. For further discussion, see Clark, New Mexico Water Law Since 1955, 2
NAT. RESOURCES J. 484, 496 (1962).
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study.46 There is, in fact, some international practice in appor-
tioning shared petroleum resources.7
46. The formula for division might be a variation of the correlative rights
prorationing formula: each country would have a share of the underlying
water in proportion to the amount of its land supplied by the groundwater
source within the designated groundwater area as compared to the total
area supplied by the groundwater source. This approach is designed for
agricultural uses, and does not comfortably suit an urban situation or
mixed agricultural-urban context.
A corrolary formula might be that each country would have a share of the
underlying water in proportion to the amount of water presently being
beneficially used by it as compared with the water being beneficially used
by the other country. This would appear to have serious objections in that it
would freeze the future use patterns in conformance to existing patterns.
The division could also be based upon the guidelines of the Helsinki Rules
regarding surface waters. See note 60 and accompanying text infra.
If the parties were unable to reach agreement on the division of the water,
it might be useful to borrow a lead from the last best offer concept of labor
relations. Under this concept, each nation could choose one member of an
arbitration panel, and then those two would select a third arbitrator with
the power to choose the proposal he or she considered most equitable, each
nation submitting a proposal of what it considered to be an equitable
division of the aquifer. The presiding arbitrator would determine which
offer he or she considered most fair, but would not be able to amend the
offer, or to compromise between the two offers, thereby assuring that each
nation would be motivated to present as reasonable an offer as possible.
The proposals of the two nations would thus be brought relatively close to
each other because an unreasonable or extreme offer would stand no
chance of being accepted.
47. Two of these binational agreements are
the agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the
Kingdom of the Netherlands on apportioning common petroleum
deposits in the Ems River estuary, and the agreement between
Austria and Czechoslovakia co-ordinating exploitation of a
common field of natural gas in the Zwernsdorf-Vysoka frontier
region between the two countries .
The former agreement between Germany and Holland provides
for joint development of any common petroleum fields found to
exist in the frontier area of the Ems River estuary. The agreement
clearly provides that concessionaires of each contracting State
shall be entitled to equal shares of the produce of extraction. Under
provisions of the agreement possession gained by actual extraction
by either party is irrelevant to determining the apportionment of
the reserve. Regardless of disproportionate production by either
German or Dutch interest-holders, the total volume of crude oil
extracted is pooled and divided equally between them as are the
costs of such extraction .... In effect the agreement creates a
form of international unitised production aimed at the primary
goal of insuring maximum production gained by efficient and co-
ordinated programming of exploitation schemes.
The agreement between Austria and Czechoslovakia over divi-
sion of common gas fields lying in the Zwernsdorf-Vysoka frontier
area . . . provides for the establishment of a joint commission
composed equally of representatives of each of the contracting
States. The commission receives the reports of a panel of petrole-
um geologists and experts and from them calculates the reserves in
the deposit, fixes the production rate and allocates production
quotas to each State. The commission also approves of and regu-
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Once the division of the groundwater was made, regardless
of the method followed in arriving at the division determination,
the internal administrative water machinery of each nation
would be responsible for allocating that nation's share of the
aquifer according to its water laws and administrative proce-
dures. This would have the advantage of providing security for
investment in water resources on each side of the border. It
would prevent the possibility of pumping wars, since each side
would know with certainty the amount of water to which it was
entitled. Further, the resource would not be threatened through
uncontrolled exploitation, and the potential for conflict between
the two countries would be reduced.
In addition, ideally there should be flexibility for transfers of
water rights from one use to another, and from one user to
another, including transfers of water rights across the boun-
dary. This, perhaps, could be accomplished by term sale ar-
rangements, somewhat akin to a lease, so that if there were a
surplus which was going unused in the allocation of one
country, and the other country had an excess of demand over its
allocation, it would be possible to buy the water from the other
country's allocation and use the water on the other side of the
border. However, realistically, one would have to suggest that
not only would such a transfer be politically impossible, but also
probably legally impossible under existing law which would
have to be preempted by a treaty. For example, New Mexico law
prohibits such transfers. 48
2. Variation B (Case-by-Case Negotiation)
Granting the IBWC the power to identify and declare "desig-
nated international groundwater areas" and the authority to
apportion the waters of such designated aquifers will be
controversial and undoubtedly strongly opposed. The difficulty
in obtaining such a treaty cannot be overestimated. Therefore, a
lates all exploitation procedures employed by either side. In fixing
the production rate so far the commission has favoured Austria in
a ratio of 14:1 on the basis, it appears, of such technical considera-
tions as reserves in place under each State's territory and the rela-
tive cost/profit ratios that would otherwise obtain if the deposit was
being worked individually instead of co-operatively under an inter-
national joint commission.
Onorato, supra note 41, at 97-98.
48. "No person shall withdraw water from any underground source in New
Mexico for use in any other state .. " N.M. STAT. ANN. § 75-11-20 (1968).
See also Comment, "It's Our Water"--Can Wyoming Constitutionally
Prohibit the Exportation of State Waters?, 10 LAND & WATER L. REV. 119
(1975). In some jurisdictions, such as Switzerland and Turkey, neighbors
are obligated to share surplus waters. See Teclaff, supra note 6, at 185.
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less far-reaching option would be a case by case or aquifer by
aquifer approach. Individual agreements would be negotiated
for each groundwater area as problems arose using a variety of
engineering and legal measures, including the negotiated appor-
tionment of the waters of the aquifer. This approach would very
possibly vary from basin to basin and agreements, therefore,
would have to be reached by treaty on a basin to basin basis.
This could be termed the pragmatic, case by case approach-
pragmatic both politically and technically. This is in fact a de-
scription of the present state of affairs. For example, pumping
in the Yuma area was dealt with in Minute 242 which limited
pumping within five miles of the border to 160,000 acre feet per
year.49 The IBWC is carrying on a data exchange program and
an aerial surveillance program to identify groundwater devel-
opments and potential trouble spots. The IBWC is keenly aware
of possible stress points such as in Ciudad Juarez-El Paso,
Nogales, and the Colorado Delta areas.
50
The problem with such a basin to basin and treaty to treaty
approach is that problems such as these are so difficult to get on
the national agenda that they tend to be shelved until a crisis is
reached. If it were politically possible, it would be desirable to
give the IBWC continuing authority to designate groundwater
areas and, therefore, control withdrawals before the crisis point
is reached.
3. Variation C (Comprehensive Management)
A third variation of the management option would be to give
the IBWC the complete spectrum of administrative powers
from investigation and planning to rule making and enforce-
ment. This would put it not only into the investigative, engineer-
ing, and planning functions, but also into the regulatory and
enforcement end of the administrative process. This, perhaps,
would be the ideal approach, but the least likely to be accepted.
It would empower the IBWC to control withdrawals, and there-
by preserve the resource, providing security to water users at
the time. It would also allow the IBWC to plan for and carry out
policies which would be responsive to changing conditions. Un-
doubtedly this would be objected to as the creation of a super
agency, and would expose the IBWC to the criticism and
controversy caused by an international agency being placed in
the business of enforcement inside the domestic boundaries of a
sovereign nation.
49. Text of IBWC Minute 242, supra note 13, at 395-96, res. 5.
50. Interview with government officials (Feb. 1978).
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D. Option 4: International Litigation
Whichever of the above options, or combinations of options,
might be chosen, it would undoubtedly be better for the two
countries to reach agreement on a binational basis rather than
allowing the problem to become so intense as to require litiga-
tion before the International Court of Justice or a tribunal of
arbitration, 1 with all of the perils, uncertainties, and delay that
litigation entails. 52
The problem, succinctly stated, is that there is a limited sup-
ply of groundwater along this international frontier, and that
both the United States and Mexico are facing the prospect of
greater demand because of increased population. It would be
highly desirable that the nations involved be rational enough to
anticipate the situation before it reaches crisis proportions. The
United States and Mexico should, by agreement, establish the
means for managing the resource and avoiding damaging dis-
putes between the two countries. Resolution 5 of Minute 242
contemplates such an agreement.53
The courts, too, undoubtedly, would prefer that the parties
settle the matter between themselves, rather than resorting to
litigation. A recent example of this judicial attitude is the North
Sea controversy, in which the International Court of Justice
remanded the dispute to the parties for negotiation and agree-
51. The Inter-American Arbitration Treaty was developed at the Havana
Conference in 1929, and ratified by the Senate of the United States in 1935.
It provides in part:
The High Contracting Parties bind themselves to submit to arbitra-
tion all differences of an international character which have arisen
or may arise between them by virtue of a claim of right made by
one against the other under treaty or otherwise, which it has not
been possible to adjust by diplomacy and which are juridical in
their nature by reason of being susceptible of decision by applica-
tion of the principles of law.
There shall be considered as included among questions of a juridi-
cal character:
a) The interpretation of a treaty;
b) Any question of international law;
c) The existence of any fact which, if established, would consti-
tute, a breach of an international obligation;
d) The nature and extent of the reparation to be made for the
breach of an international obligation.
Inter-American Arbitration Treaty With Other American Republics, Jan. 5,
1929, 49 Stat. 3153, 3158, T.S. No. 886, at 6 (effective April 16, 1935). For a
discussion of the agreement, see Meyers & Noble, The Colorado River: The
Treaty with Mexico, 19 STAN. L. REv. 367, 400-02 (1967).
52. For a comprehensive discussion of dispute settlements ranging from "re-
ferral to government" to arbitration and the International Court of Justice,
see Management of International Water Resources: Institutional and Le-
gal Aspects, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/5 144 (1975).
53. Text of IBWC Minute No. 242, supra note 13, at 396, res. 5.
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ment on their maritime boundaries in the North Sea.5 4 The
United States Supreme Court made the point clearly in a water
quality case when it stated: "We cannot withhold the suggestion
... that the grave problem of sewage disposal ... is one more
likely to be wisely solved by cooperative study and by confer-
ence and mutual concession on the part of representatives of the
States so vitally interested in it than by proceedings in any court
however constituted. 5 5 The Court, in Colorado v. Kansas,5 6
further elaborated:
The reason for judicial caution in adjudicating the relative rights of
States in such cases is that . . . they involve the interests of quasi-
sovereigns, . . . of interstate differences of a like nature, that such
mutual accommodation and agreement should, if possible, be the
medium of settlement, instead of the invocation of our adjudicatory
power.
57
Ward Fischer concludes that, in regard to interstate groundwa-
ter problems in the United States, there are "two apparently
viable alternatives ... : [t]he interstate compact, and litigation
between the states."5 8 However, he is pessimistic in his assess-
ment of the likelihood of the states reaching agreement before
the crisis point is reached and resort to the courts is necessary:
Our conclusion must be that the interstate compact is by far the
most effective, most sound, most flexible, and over-all most satisfac-
tory approach that can be recommended. Regrettably, our conclu-
sions must also be that, between these two alternatives, it is also the
less likely; that litigation between the states resulting in equitable
apportionment of available ground waters can be expected, unless
there is an unprecedented awakening to responsibility and to reality
among the water users and water administrators of the affected
states.
59
54. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 591 (1969).
55. New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 313 (1921).
56. 320 U.S. 383 (1943).
57. Id. at 392 (emphasis added).
58. Fischer, supra note 10, at 546.
59. Id. The discussion in the United States has been going on for some time. In
1961, the Senate Committee's final report commented that "[it is possible
that where underground aquifers cross State boundaries consideration
will have to be given to interstate compacts to control ground water with-
drawals, to prevent one State from exhausting water supplies used by
another State." S. REP. No. 29, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1961). See also J.
MUYS, INTERSTATE WATER COMPACTS (1971).
In fact, the more modern interstate compacts are now expressly dealing
with groundwaters to some degree. For example, the 1969 Niobara River
Compact between Wyoming and Nebraska recognizes that groundwater
withdrawals may affect the depletion of the Niobrara. Act of Aug. 4, 1969,
Pub. L. No. 91-52, 83 Stat. 86. The Blue River Compact of 1971 between
Kansas and Nebraska includes groundwater infiltration as part of the
natural flow of the stream. Act of June 2, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-308, 86 Stat.
193. The Delaware River Basin Compact (Delaware, Pennsylvania, New
Jersey, New York, and the United States 1965) recognizes the interrelation-
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The record of dealing with joint water problems between the
United States and Mexico is a good one, and leaves some room
for hope, perhaps even optimism, that Mexico and the United
States may be able to handle the problem in advance by agree-
ment rather than by resort to international litigation. "In any
event, we must expect that our international conflicts will not be
limited to surface waters, but rather that, sooner or later, we
must grapple with the depletion and pollution of international
underground waters. '60
In the event a groundwater question between Mexico and the
United States resulted in litigation, the court undoubtedly
would conclude that a nation does not have absolute territorial
sovereignty and that it cannot act in disregard of its neighbor.6 1
In the interstate water litigation between Wyoming and
Colorado, the United States Supreme Court reached an analo-
gous conclusion:
The contention of Colorado that she, as a State rightfully may
divert and use, as she may choose, the waters flowing within her
boundaries in this interstate stream, regardless of any prejudice that
this may work to others having rights in the stream below her bound-
ary, can not be maintained. The river throughout its course in both
States is but a single stream, wherein each State has an interest which
should be respected by the other.
62
The International Court, if given the case by agreement of the
parties, would no doubt also look with favor upon the language
of the Supreme Court 63 in a suit by Kansas against Colorado for
equitable apportionment of the Arkansas River:
ship of ground and surface waters and declares that "'Water resources'
shall include water and related national resources in, on, under, or above
the ground, including related uses of land, which are subject to beneficial
use, ownership or control." Act of Sept. 27, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-328,75 Stat.
688, 690. See also Hayton, Institutional Alternatives for Mexico-U.S.
Groundwater Management, 18 NAT. RESOURCES J. 201 (1978).
60. Fischer, supra note 10, at 545.
61. See Utton, International Streams and Lakes, in 2 WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS 422 (R. Clark ed. 1967).
62. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 466 (1922). See Wyoming v. Colorado,
286 U.S. 494 (1952).
63. In the Trial Smelter international arbitration, which involved transbound-
ary air pollution, the Tribunal, by agreement of the parties, relied heavily
on U.S. interstate decisions:
There are, however, as regards, both air pollution and water
pollution, certain decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States which may legitimately be taken as a guide in this field of
international law, for it is reasonable to follow by analogy, in inter-
national cases, precedents established by that court in dealing with
controversies between States of the Union or with other controver-
sies concerning the quasi-sovereign rights of such States, where no
contrary rule prevails in international law and no reason for reject-
ing such precedents can be adduced from the limitations of
sovereignty inherent in the Constitution of the United States.
Trail Smelter Arbitral Decision, 35 Am. J. INT'L L. 684, 714 (1941).
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Whenever... the action of one State reaches through the agency of
natural laws into the territory of another State, the question of the
extent and the limitations of the rights of the two States becomes a
matter of justiciable dispute between them, and this court is called
upon to settle that dispute in such a way as will recognize the equal
rights of both and at the same time establish justice between them.6 4
The much quoted International Trail Smelter case, although
dealing with air pollution, would also be relevant for it states
that, under the principles of international law, . . . no State has the
right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to
cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another ... when the
case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear
and convincing evidence.65
Thus, an international tribunal undoubtedly would reject the
international law equivalent of the common law doctrine-abso-
lute territorial sovereignty. It would, instead, look to the Hel-
sinki Rules for guidance in settling a case on the basis of equi-
table utilization.66 The Helsinki Rules were promulgated in 1966
by the International Law Association to govern the use of inter-
national water resources. They provide in Article V:
(2) Relevant factors which are to be considered include, but are not
limited to:
(a) The geography of the basin, including in particular the extent
of the drainage area in the territory of each basin State;
(b) The hydrology of the basin, including in particular the contri-
bution of water by each basin State;
(c) The climate affecting the basin;
(d) The past utilization of the waters of the basin, including in
particular existing utilization;
(e) The economic and social needs of each basin State;
(f) The population dependent on the waters of the basin in each
basin State;
(g) The comparative costs of alternative means of satisfying the
economic and social needs of each basin State;
(h) The availability of other resources;
(i) The avoidance of unnecessary waste in the utilization of wa-
ters of the basin;
(j) The practicability of compensation to one or more of the co-
basin States as a means of adjusting conflicts among uses; and
(k) The degree to which the needs of a basin State may be satis-
fied, without causing substantial injury to a co-basin State.
(3) The weight to be given to each factor is to be determined by its
importance in comparison with that of other relevant factors. In deter-
mining what is a reasonable and equitable share, all relevant factors
are to be considered together with a conclusion reached on the basis of
the whole.
6 7
64. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97-98 (1907).
65. Trail Smelter Arbitral Decision, supra note 63, at 716.
66. Utton, supra note 61, at 422.
67. The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of Int'l Rivers, art. 5, in
Management of International Water Resources: Institutional and Legal
Aspects, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/5 188-89 (1975).
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Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has said that equi-
table apportionment
calls for the exercise of an informed judgment on a consideration of
many factors. Priority of appropriation is the guiding principle. But
physical and climatic conditions, the consumptive use of water in
several sections of the river, the character and rate of return flows, the
extent of established uses, the availability of storage water, the practi-
cal effect of wasteful uses on downstream areas, the damage to up-
stream areas as compared to the benefits to downstream areas if a
limitation is imposed on the former-these are all relevant factors.
They are merely an illustrative, not an exhaustive, catalogue. They
indicate the nature of the problem of apportionment and the delicate
adjustment of interests which must be made.68
The problem with litigation is that the question is referred to the
court as a last resort when the crisis has already been reached.
The courts deal in a case by case, after-the-fact manner, and are
not in a position to anticipate the problem, and to engage in the
long term planning and management of the resource that is
desirable if optimum use is to be achieved.
Further doubts about leaving groundwater questions to the
courts were raised some years ago:
The hydrologic data required for adequate information about supply,
evaporation and movement of groundwater are difficult to obtain and
the courts do not have adequate staffs to do the necessary fact gather-
ing job. Consequently, the parties must supply the experts at great
expense.... Moreover, the courts.., have a long record of ignoring
scientific development in this field and are certainly not expert agen-
cies from an engineering perspective .... 69
However, the most important shortcoming of the courts is the
after-the-fact, ad hoc nature of their jurisdiction. Tribunals are
not equipped to provide the continuing investigative and ad-
ministrative machinery required to manage the resource.
As the Supreme Court said in Colorado v. Kansas,70 water
cases "present complicated and delicate questions, and, due to
the possibility of future change of conditions, necessite expert
administration rather than judicial imposition of a hard and
fast rule. '71
E. Conclusions
Of the various alternatives, perhaps the option most likely to
be accepted would be a compromise position between the uto-
pian international commission, with the complete panoply of
powers from investigation and planning to regulation and en-
68. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945).
69. M. McDOUGAL AND D. HABER, supra note 35, at 993.
70. 320 U.S. 383 (1943).
71. Id. at 392.
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forcement, and the existing status quo of inactivity awaiting the
crisis.
A relatively objective and, therefore, perhaps acceptable ap-
proach would be one that provided the means for an equitable
apportionment of transboundary groundwaters, leaving the ac-
tual planning, distribution, regulations, and enforcement of
each country's share to that country.
Ward Fischer, in discussing interstate compacts, has stated
that one of the basic decisions
required in the development of any particular compact is that be-
tween allocation v. management. Should the compact provide that
each state is allocated a specific quantity of water? Or, on the other
hand, should the states agree that the water resource is one that
should be subject to year-to-year to decade-to-decade management,
without specific quantities of water allocated to the participating
states? Allocation in absolute quantities or in percentages, is the sim-
plest solution. Management is no doubt the best, allowing, for exam-
ple, planned recharging of the underground water resource for the
ultimate greater benefit of all of the states.
72
The allocation option is likely to be the simplest for internation-
al groundwaters as well. Specifically, this has been the model
followed in the case of surface waters shared by the United
States and Mexico where the waters of the Rio Grande and
the Colorado have been divided by quantity, leaving the actual
administration of each country's amount to each respective
country. 73
It is possible to develop the following skeletal outline of an
allocation procedure:
1. The IBWC should be empowered to declare any ground-
water resource that is divided by the international boun-
dary to be a "designated international groundwater
area" when in its judgment (a) demand is likely to ex-
ceed recharge so as to endanger sustained yield or water
quality due to salt water intrusion, (b) groundwater
withdrawals are likely to affect or be interrelated with
surface waters previously allocated by treaty,7 4 or (c)
72. Fischer, supra note 10, at 532.
73. N. HUNDLEY, DIVIDING THE WATERS (1966); C. SEPULVEDA, LA FRONTERA
NORTE DE M1xICO (1976); Meyers, The Colorado Basin, in THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS 486-607 (A. Garretson, R. Hayton & C.
Olmstead eds. 1967); Utton, supra note 61, § 152.2.
74. This language is intended to avoid the complexities developed in the water
law of the western United States by classifications such as "tributary" and
"non-tributary" waters, "percolating waters," "subterranean streams flow-
ing through definite channels," and "underfiow of streams," while recog-
nizing "the interrelationship between many surface and groundwater sour-
ces." Clark, supra note 10, § 441, at 415.
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prudent management of the groundwater resource in-
cluding the decision to mine groundwater makes such
designation desirable.75
2. Upon declaring a "designated international groundwa-
ter area" and after carrying on the necessary engineer-
ing studies, the IBWC should equitably apportion the
designated area between the two countries using estab-
lished engineering criteria. The IBWC should first ob-
tain information concerning aquifer thickness, satu-
rated thickness, depths, area, quantity, and quality of
the area, as well as transmissibility, permeability, re-
charge rates, and other pertinent hydrologic data, be-
fore apportioning the waters of the designated area.
Using this data, the IBWC should then apportion the water,
bearing in mind the following:
1. the geography of the area, including each nation's pro-
portion of total surface area overlying the designated
international groundwater area;
2. the hydrology of the area including, (a) each nation's
proportion of the total volume of the water in the desig-
nated international groundwater area which lies within
that nation's territory, (b) the contribution of recharge
by each nation, and (c) other relevant hydrologic con-
siderations;
3. pre-existing utilization by each state;
4. in the event of prolonged drought which in the judgment
of the IBWC significantly affects recharge, the IBWC
should be authorized to reduce the total allowable with-
drawal from the designated international groundwater
area for so long as the IBWC deems necessary, and each
nation's withdrawal shall be accordingly reduced pro-
portionally.7 6
Each of these items can be determined with a reasonable
75. This is a general provision designed to give the IBWC flexibility in anti-
cipating potential problem areas and exercising its judgment as hydrologic
data is developed through its own initiative or the activity of others.
76. See 1974 Water Utilization Act, United Republic of Tanzania, reported in
Hayton, supra note 1, at 281-82. Article 10 of the 1944 Colorado River
Treaty provides that "[in the event of extraordinary drought.., the water
allotted to Mexico ... will be reduced in the same proportion as consump-
tive uses in the United States are reduced." Treaty respecting Utilization of
Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, Feb. 3,
1944, art. 10, 59 Stat. 1219, 1237-38 (1946), T.S. No. 994 (effective Nov. 8, 1945).
See also Sepulveda, Instituci6nes Para la Soluci6n de Problemas de
Aguas de Superficie Entre Mexico y los Estados Unidos, 18 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 131 (1978).
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degree of certainty and would provide an objective basis for
apportionment. They incorporate some of the central concepts
of the Helsinki Rules and avoid the complexities of some of the
more subjective criteria of the Helsinki Rules such as
(e) The economic and social needs of each basin state;...
(i) The avoidance of unnecessary waste in the utilization of waters of
the basin;...
(k) The degree to which the needs of a basin State may be satisfied,
without causing substantial injury to a co-basin State."
However, in making the decision whether to mine or not to
mine, it would be necessary, certainly, to consider the economic
and social needs of the countries.7 8
V. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. The Interrelationship of Surface and Groundwaters
In the management of international groundwaters, it is es-
sential to recognize the interrelationships between surface and
groundwaters, which frequently are interconnected.
Contrary to hydrologic reality, the law frequently has made
distinctions which separate surface waters from underground
waters and "percolating waters" from definite underground
channels. These distinctions fail to recognize the interrelation-
ships between surface and underground waters and have been
characterized as attempts to restate the "physical universe."
79
Scientists have criticized themselves and the law on this
subject:
Man has coped with the complexity of water by trying to compart-
mentalize it. The partition committed by hydrologists. . . is as noth-
ing compared with that which has been promulgated by the legal
profession, which has on occasion borrowed from the criminal code
to term some waters "fugitive" and others "a common enemy." The
legal classification of water includes "percolating waters," "defined
underground streams," "underflow of surface streams," "water-
courses," and "diffuse surface waters;" all these waters are actually
interrelated and interdependent, yet in many jurisdictions unrelated
water rights rest upon this classification.8"
In view of the agreed upon allocations of surface waters for
the Rio Grande and Colorado and the example of the Santa
Cruz River upon which both Nogales, Sonora, and Nogales,
77. The Helsinki Rules, supra note 67, art. 5, at 189.
78. See text accompanying note 93 infra.
79. C. CORKER, supra note 42, at 146-47.
80. Thomas & Leopold, Ground Water in North America, 143 Sci. 1001, 1003
(1964) (emphasis added).
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Arizona, depend,8 ' it is absolutely essential that the interrela-
tionship between surface and groundwaters be recognized.
82
We have been discussing ground water more or less as if it were
separate and distinct from the rest of the hydrologic cycle. Such segre-
gation has been common among hydrologists as well as the general
public, and is reflected in legislation, in the division of responsibility
among government -agencies, in development and regulation. Yet it is
clear that this isolation can be maintained only when and where water
is being mined from underground storage. Any water pumped from
wells under equilibrium conditions is necessarily diverted into the
aquifer from somewhere else, perhaps from other aquifers, perhaps
from streams or lakes, perhaps from wetlands-ideally, but not neces-
sarily, from places where it was of no use to anyone. There are enough
examples of streamflow depletion by ground-water development, and
of ground-water pollution from wastes released into surface waters, to
attest to the close though variable relation between surface water and
ground water.83
Thus, the IBWC will undoubtedly have to treat differently two
major classifications of groundwaters: (1) those that are tribut-
ary to surface water flows, or more precisely, those which are
interrelated to surface water flows (which would include, for
example, the Santa Cruz, which is tributary to the groundwater
supply); and (2) those which are not connected hydrologically
with any identifiable surface stream or lake.84
In fact, the Rio Grande itself has already provided extensive
hydrologic and institutional experience concerning the interre-
lationships between surface flows and the associated alluvial
groundwater system. Hydrologic studies have shown
an intimate hydraulic relationship between the Rio Grande and the
adjacent groundwater reservoirs. There are extensive sedimentary
rocks along the main stem of the Rio Grande, and these rocks form the
principal aquifer adjacent to the river. This aquifer is recharged di-
rectly by precipitation, by lateral underflow of water from adjacent
formations, by seepage of water from Rio Grande tributaries, and in
some areas by seepage from the Rio Grande main stem.85
Pumping from groundwater flows thus can have direct ef-
fects on surface water flows which can be calculated once the
characteristics of the aquifer are known. Using the formula
devised by C.V. Theis,86 the State Engineer of New Mexico has
81. See Bradley & DeCook, supra note 7.
82. See NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 230
(1973); Clark, Groundwater Management: Law and Local Response, 6
ARiz. L. REV. 178, 189 (1965); Hayton, supra note 59.
83. Thomas & Leopold, supra note 80, at 1003.
84. Flint, Ground Water Law and Administration: A New Mexico Viewpoint,
14 RocKY MTN. MINERAL L. INST. 545, 551 (1968).
85. Id. at 552.
86. Theis, The Effect of a Well on the Flow of a Nearby Stream, in 22 Am.
GEOPHYSICAL UNION TRANSACTIONS 734-38 (pt. II 1941).
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devised a system of administration which allows new appropri-
ations of groundwater in the Rio Grande basin in New Mexico
only "under the condition that the appropriator acquire and
retire from usage surface-water rights in amounts sufficient, at
each point in time, to compensate for the increasing effects of
his pumping on the stream. 8 7 This conjunctive administration
of surface and groundwaters protects prior users of both, and
has been upheld by the Supreme Court of New Mexico. 88
B. The Concept of Safe Yield
As Professor Clark succinctly points out, "[a]ll water being
pumped from below the earth's surface is either being replaced
at measurable, or discernible, rates, or it is not."89 Where with-
drawal exceeds recharge, the water is being mined and "[t]hus
all ground water pumped is either 'mined,' i.e., extracted for
certain purposes over a relatively short period of time, or it is
being withdrawn as 'milked' from nature's aquifers with some
view to continued use for a long or indefinite period . .. "90 The
term "safe yield," although often criticized, has been used in this
article and elsewhere to indicate generally the "milking" of
underground water at rates which would allow for continued
use in the future.
The following provides a good definition of safe yield or
sustained yield: "The practical sustained yield is the amount of
water which can be withdrawn annually without producing un-
desirable effects. The practical sustained yield may be limited
to an amount less than recharge but cannot exceed the long-
term mean annual recharge." 91 The term safe yield is often
criticized and frequently avoided in the hydrologic literature
because of its uncertainty. "[I]t has come to be recognized that
the quantity of water which can be extracted annually from a
reservoir-surface or underground-depends on both hydro-
logic and non-hydrologic factors, and that neither hydrologic
nor non-hydrologic factors can be determined or predicted pre-
cisely. '92 Non-hydrologic factors include economic and legal
considerations, such as prior water rights.
93
87. Flint, supra note 84, at 553.
88. City of Albuquerque v. Reynolds, 71 N.M. 428, 379 P.2d 73 (1962).
89. Clark, supra note 82, at 189-90.
90. Id.
91. W. WALTON, GROUNDWATER RESOURCE EVALUATION 608 (1970).
92. C. CORKER, supra note 42, at 169-70. Clark concludes that the "'safe yield'
concept is properly discredited ... and should be discarded by lawyers."
Clark, supra note 44, at 483 n.75.
93. W. WALTON, supra note 91, at 608-09.
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C. Flow Versus Stock Resources
A useful concept is the distinction between flow and stock
resources. Flow resources are self-replenishing, and would in-
clude those groundwaters which are being recharged on a
continuing basis as part of the hydrologic cycle of precipitation
and evaporation. It is these groundwaters which would be used
on a sustained yield basis.
However, there are aquifers with small recharge, but with a
large amount of water in underground storage which "for all
practical purposes ... has been sidetracked from the hydro-
logic cycle and is no longer in transit. In human time, at least, it
is not a self-replenishing, but an exhaustible resource, similar to
petroleum and other minerals. '94
These non-replenishing groundwaters are, for all practical
purposes, exhaustible stock resources; they are not being re-
plenished. Thus continued extraction will lead in time to their
complete exhaustion. When exhaustion occurs, or when further
mining becomes impractical, the economic activities and other
uses dependent upon that supply must turn to other sources or
be abandoned:
With a stock resource the decisions to be made are whether and
when to use it. A property rights doctrine should recognize that rights
to such resources do not involve a perpetual supply. It should permit a
decision to hold the stock for use at a later time if it is so desired.
In a flow resource the problem is to make the best use of the supply
which is continuously available though not necessarily, and in the case
of water ordinarily not, at a constant rate.95
Thus, the concept of sustained yield is useful for aquifers re-
charging on a continuing basis, and the concept of mining is
appropriate for stock resource underground waters which are
not receiving significant recharge.
D. Management of Groundwater Mining
A number of considerations are involved in making a ration-
al decision to mine groundwaters in appropriate circumstances.
It has been postulated that a principal purpose of groundwa-
ter law should be "to provide for an orderly development of
ground-water supplies, in the interest of the best utilization of
this natural resource 96 and that these laws ordinarily, there-
fore, do not sanction diversions that would adversely affect the
94. Bagley, Water Rights Law and Public Policies Relating to Ground Water
"Mining" in the Southwestern States, 4 J. L. & EcoN. 144, 147 (1961).
95. Id. at 153 (emphasis added).
96. W. HUTCHINS, supra note 34, at 178.
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"complete development of the safe yield found to exist in the
area" 97 in order to preserve the water supply in perpetuity. This
is an admirable statement when related to flow groundwaters;
but what of stock groundwaters?
It must not be overlooked that in some situations, as a matter
of policy,
the mining of water can be justified in the same way as the mining of
non-renewable mineral resources such as uranium, oil, or coal. It is
not practical to operate a groundwater basin on a continuous yield
basis when the amount of water in storage is very large compared to
the annual recharge.
98
Thus, the decision with respect to stock groundwaters is
"whether and when to use"99 them, in that they are not a replen-
ishing, perpetual supply. In order not to oversimplify, it must be
pointed out that flow resource groundwaters can be mined too-
97. Id.
98. The complete text follows:
It is desirable, of course, that the ground-water resources be
available to future generations in perpetuity; however, the mining
of water can be justified as readily as the mining of any of our other
mineral resources such as uranium, oil, or coal. It is not practical to
operate a ground water basin on a continuous-yield basis when the
amount of water in storage is very large compared with the average
annual recharge. An example is the Lea County Basin in southeast-
ern New Mexico where the average annual recharge is 29,000 acre-
feet per year and the permitted withdrawals will average about
440,000 acre-feet per year. The great value of the approximately 27
million acre-feet in storage in the basin when pumping began can
be realized only by mining. Furthermore, to justify the marketing,
storage, and transportation facilities essential to a competent ag-
ricultural economy in the area it is necessary for the withdrawals to
exceed the recharge.
While it is possible to justify the mining of ground-water re-
sources, the practice will make it necessary to face serious water
supply problems in the future. In some instances it will be possible
to meet these problems only by complete readjustment of the econ-
omy of the area. While long range predictions of the value of water
in various uses are dangerous, it appears likely that it will not be, in
general, economically feasible to import water over appreciable
distances for agricultural purposes when the local ground-water
resources have been mined out. However, when reduced well yields
or excessive lifts make pumping for agricultural purposes un-
economic, the residual water may well supply the municipal and
industrial needs of a vigorous non-agricultural economy for many
years.
In Lea County pumping for irrigation will probably be un-
economic when about two-thirds of the aquifer is dewatered. At
that time there will probably remain substantial valuable reserves
of oil and gas in the area. To produce and process those reserves it
will be necessary to use numerous low-production wells to pump
the residual fresh water, and it may also be necessary to desalinize
the abundant brackish waters and brines that occur in the area.
Clark, supra note 82, at 190 n.48 (statement of S.E. Reynolds, State Eng'r,
Santa Fe, N.M., Sept. 30, 1959).
99. Bagley, supra note 94, at 153.
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that is, when withdrawals exceed recharge-and this frequent
practice is what actually gave rise to the conservation concept
of sustained yield.
There may be situations in which it is advisable to "mine"
water in basins in which there is significant but inadequate
recharge to meet water needs. However, such decisions should
be made consciously and with knowledge of the economic and
social consequences, and an appreciation of the fact that the
options of future generations will be limited.
It has been argued that sustained yield should not be a sacred
principle, that the decision to mine can be a rational alternative,
but that " '[S]afe yield'-if a proper term can be discovered, or if
the old term can be acceptably defined-should be the basis of
operation of every groundwater resource""1 ' until the decision
to mine is made consciously and with full knowledge of its
implications.
Such decisions have to be made after thorough investigation
and consideration, and the development has to be in an orderly,
rational manner; this is particularly so where the groundwater
resource is divided by an international boundary, in view of the
fact that depletion of the resource and the consequent damage
to the other country cannot easily be corrected by natural re-
charge and, at least stock groundwaters, "once removed, are,
for all practical purposes, gone forever.' 0'1
Such considerations as the spacing of wells, the rate of draw-
down, and the portion for each country need to be carried out
according to a reasoned development plan.10 2
The New Mexico Supreme Court has recognized the validity
of mining groundwaters for reasoned policy goals and, at the
same time, recognized the need for careful management of such
mining:
The administration of a non-rechargeable basin, if the waters
therein are to be applied to a beneficial use, requires giving to the
stock or supply of water a time dimension, or, to state it otherwise,
requires the fixing of a rate of withdrawal which will result in a
determination of the economic life of the basin at a selected time.
The very nature of the finite stock of water in a non-rechargeable
basin compels a modification of the traditional concept of appropri-
able supply under the appropriation doctrine. Each appropriation
100. C. CORKER, supra note 42, at 174.
101. Fischer, supra note 10, at 524.
102. As Professor Clark suggests: "A plan should be developed to control fu-
ture uses, irrespective of whether the aquifer is stabilized or must of neces-
sity be mined." Clark, supra note 82, at 818.
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from a limited supply of non-replaceable water of necessity reduces
the supply in quantity and shortens the time of use to something less
than perpetuity. Each appropriator, subsequent to the initial appro-
priation, reduces in amount, and in time of use, the supply of water
available to all prior appropriators, with the consequent decline of the
water table, higher pumping costs, and lower yields.
10 3
In areas declared to be "designated international groundwater
areas" by the IBWC, the commission should apportion the wa-
ters and rate of withdrawal, since the "time dimension"'10 4 is an
essential aspect of the apportioned water right.10 5 Particularly
in closed or non-tributary areas, the capability to plan depletion
over a calculated period is essential. Often the hydrologic and
economic considerations are quite complicated. As an example
of the type of factors that must be considered, the State En-
gineer of New Mexico suggests that if it were determined to set
a fixed "life" for the basin and then apportion the water by fixing the
annual rates for each nation, deferral of development would be dis-
couraged and there would be a race to achieve the allowed rate of
withdrawal at the earliest time to maximize the quantity that could be
taken within the "life" of the basin. On the other hand, if there is no
limitation on the annual rate, that nation which takes its allocated
quantum at a slower rate will have greater pumping lifts and possibly
a worse quality of water; this could be mitigated by imposing a rea-
sonable limitation on the annual rate of withdrawal as well as specify-
ing the quantum allocated to each nation. In most situations, it prob-
ably would also be useful to require some areal distribution of with-
drawals to insure that one country does not damage the other (and
perhaps itself) by concentrating its withdrawals along the internation-
al boundary. 0 6
Fortunately, the IBWC has that capability. It has the staff,
resources, and experience to call on various disciplines for
input.
[A]s war is too important to be left to the generals, water law is too
important to be left to water lawyers (or the engineers or the econom-
ists) alone. Initial inputs and along-the-way review . . . should be
elicited from each of the relevant disciplines, to insure the economic,
engineering, and administrative soundness ... [of the decision]. 0 7
In addition, contributions from those most affected by the deci-
sion would appear to be appropriate through a hearing process.
103. Mathers v. Texaco, Inc., 77 N.M. 239, 243-44, 421 P.2d 771, 775 (1966).
104. Flint, supra note 84, at 568. See also Bagley, supra note 94, at 154-55.
105. See Fundingsland v. Colorado Ground Water Comm'n, 171 Colo. 487, 468
P.2d 835 (1970). The court approved a rate of depletion based on a 25 year
period.
106. Letter from S.E. Reynolds, State Eng'r, Sante Fe, N.M., to Albert Utton
(Aug. 29, 1977). See Bagley, supra note 94, at 154; Clark, supra note 2, at
159.
107. Hayton, supra note 1, at 288.
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E. Criticism of Equitable Apportionment
The equitable apportionment approach to dividing ground-
waters does not place a comprehensive planning power in an
international agency and, therefore, can be criticized for not
striving for "optimum utilization."10 8 This is a valid criticism.
Rather than optimum utilization, this option seeks equitable
apportionment, a quantitative division of available supply.
Such a division of the waters is simpler and, perhaps, politically
possible. Even this will be a difficult achievement. 0 9 Equitable
apportionment between the United States and Mexico would
have the following advantages:
1. Certainty would be increased. Through quantification
each nation would know its entitlement and could plan,
grow, and develop accordingly. As one commentator has
said, "[m]aximum development of water resources de-
pends in large measure upon the principle of certainty
"110
2. Political accountability would be enhanced. Within each
nation there would be control over the decision as to how
that nation's share should be allocated and used. Thus,
the decision-making process would be subject to the ordi-
nary political process of each country."'
3. The strength and reputation of the IBWC would be pro-
tected from the abrasions that would be incurred by
periodic adjustments, not to mention day-to-day water
administration within the boundaries of the sovereign
nations.
4. The potential for dispute between the two countries
would be reduced greatly.
5. And, of course, of elemental importance, equitable ap-
portionment just might be politically possible; proposing
anything more would border on utopian unreality.
F. The Need for Flexibility
Perhaps the major shortcoming of an equitable apportion-
ment immutably enshrined by a decision of the IBWC, for ex-
108. Utton, International Water Quality Law, 13 NAT. RESOURCES J. 282, 309
(1973).
109. See generally LaMarquand, Politics of International River Basin Coop-
eration and Management, 16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 883 (1976).
110. Flint, supra note 84, at 570.
111. Fox, Institutions for Water Management in a Changing World, 16 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 743 (1976); Ingram, The Political Economy of Regional Water
Institutions, 55 An. J. AGRIC. ECON. 10 (1973).
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ample, is that of inflexibility. As new information becomes
known, determinations such as the boundaries and recharge
sources of a particular aquifer, or rate of recharge or sustained
yield may need to be adjusted. "It is seldom that any single value
of practical sustained yield can be correct for an extended time,
in part due to changing economic conditions." 1
12
In order to be responsive to changing conditions and new
knowledge, it would be desirable to provide the IBWC with
authority for periodic rtview and adjustment. Reopening for
further consideration decisions previously made has the poten-
tial for being disruptive-often it is better to let sleeping dogs
lie-but the complexity of the hydrologic and economic factors
indicates the need for some periodic review and the power to
make adjustments, even at the expense of certainty and political
tranquility. It would appear that basic apportionment decisions
should not be tampered with except in extraordinary circum-
stances, but determinations concerning sustained yield and de-
cisions whether to mine or not, and at what rate, could well be
adjusted with changing conditions and information.
G. Necessary Preliminary Action
In order to obtain the hydrologic and geographic data neces-
sary for the declaration of designated international groundwa-
ter areas, specific actions need to be taken. Professor Clark
suggests:
1. The International Boundary and Water Commission ... [carry
out] a joint research program which would include an inven-
tory of ground water supplies, detailing the areas of availability
and present uses. The program should include the study of non-
tributary sources and of other surface and ground waters that
are interdependent. ...
3. This program coordinated on both sides of the border should
include the drilling of strategic test wells, well metering, and
record keeping which will encompass water quality matters.
Selected areas of heavy demand and diminishing supplies
should be studied first, particularly in the heavily populated
areas .... 113
In fact the IBWC is carrying on an inventory of groundwater
supplies and is exchanging data between the United States and
Mexican sections of the IBWC.
114
112. W. WALTON, supra note 91, at 608-09.
113. Clark, supra note 2, at 160 (footnotes omitted).
114. Interview with government officials (Feb. 1978). See Day, supra note 7, at
176.
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Included in the inventory of groundwater supplies and pre-
sent uses should be the identification and registration of all
existing wells. Ideally, there should be compulsory metering
and testing of all wells exceeding a specified capacity. All regis-
tered wells should be certified by data, volume, and location. 115
With this inventory of existing uses and demand, combined with
the hydrologic inventory of groundwater supply and quality,
the safe yield could be projected or a "calculated program of
mining the water supply developed."' 116 The IBWC could then
declare a designated international groundwater area, apportion
the resource between the nations, and so control withdrawals
according to the apportionment and the projected yields or cal-
culated depletion program.
In areas in which there is inadequate data, the IBWC would
await the development of data from other sources and the
completion of its own studies. This would allow the IBWC to
phase its activities with the development along the border, utili-
zation of the resource, and availability of information.
As the physical resources of each area become understood,
the IBWC could declare additional designated international
groundwater areas in order to ensure the prudent utilization of
the groundwater resources divided by the international boun-
dary.
H. Enforcement
The actual allocation, administration, and enforcement of
water rights within each nation's portion of water in a desig-
nated international groundwater area would be within the na-
tional jurisdiction of that nation and its appropriate political
subdivisions.
In addition, there should be a generally overriding, supervis-
ory enforcement power lodged in the IBWC, to ensure that each
nation lives within the total water budget allocated to it by the
basic apportionment. "The designated international agency
must implement administrative authority which is broad
enough to carry out the policies of the two countries; this au-
thority must be strong enough to enforce policies designed for
particular ground water areas along and near the border."117
Basic to the monitoring process of the IBWC is the continuing
acquisition of information obtained from the metering of wells.
"There must be a system of measurement of withdrawals from
115. Clark, supra note 102, at 816-17.
116. Id. at 817.
117. Clark, supra note 2, at 159.
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wells .... Records must be kept of withdrawals over a period
of time," 118 and the IBWC must be able to assure that withdraw-
als do not exceed allocated amounts in the designated interna-
tional groundwater areas which are based on calculated mining
programs or determined safe yield in terms of water quality and
water quantity-specifically the prevention of salt water intru-
sion.
The IBWC's existing treaty authority and established diplo-
matic channels could be looked to to settle disputes that might
arise with respect to the interpretation or application of the
treaty.119
118. Id.
119. The Commission is authorized "to settle all differences that may arise
between the two governments with respect to the interpretation or applica-
tion of the treaty, subject to the approval of the two governments." Treaty
Respecting Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of
the Rio Grande, Feb. 3, 1944, 59 Stat. 1291, T.S. No. 944 (effective Nov. 8,
1945).
